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Hong Zhang∗, W. Steven Gray† and Oscar R. González‡
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529-0246, U.S.A.
This paper introduces a class of stochastic hybrid models for the analysis of closed-
loop control systems implemented with NASA’s Recoverable Computer System. Such
Recoverable Computer Systems have been proposed to insure reliable control performance
in harsh environments. The stochastic hybrid models consist of either a stochastic finite-
state automaton or a finite-state machine driven by a Markov input, which in turn drives
a switched linear discrete-time dynamical system. Their stability and output tracking
performance are analyzed using an extension of the existing theory for Markov jump-linear
systems. For illustration, a stochastic hybrid model is used to calculate the tracking error
performance of a Boeing 737 at cruising altitude and in closed-loop with a Recoverable
Computer System subject to neutron-induced single-event upsets. The upsets are modeled
with a Markov process. The results are validated using experimental data obtained from
a simulated neutron environment in NASA’s SAFETI Laboratory.
I. Introduction
W
hen cosmic rays collide with oxygen and nitrogen atoms in the earth’s upper atmosphere, free neutrons
are produced with energies varying from 10 MeV to 1 GeV.1,2 The higher the altitude, the higher the
neutron flux and energy.3 When a neutron passes through a solid state device, it has been observed that
stored electric charge can be locally redistributed, which may cause a single-event effect (SEE). If this charge
resides in a solid state memory device, for example a computer’s cache memory, a binary “one” can be flipped
to a “zero” or vice versa. It is also possible for dielectric material in the device to rupture and create short
circuits, which can burn out neighboring devices if sufficient electric potential exists.4,5 Normally, the errors
due to SEE’s are classified into two categories: soft errors and hard errors.6,7 Soft errors by their nature are
nondestructive to the hardware but alter memory contents and/or computer logic. Their effects are usually
transient, but may require the hardware to be reset or refreshed. Hard errors, on the other hand, may be
destructive. Chip burnouts cause permanent malfunctioning of the hardware. Another hard error is latchup,
which is a potentially destructive short-circuit that can be corrected by resetting the hardware. Single event
upsets (SEU’s) are defined as soft errors, induced by radiation, that produce a malfunction at some level in
the system, which is usually transient and nondestructive to the hardware. However, if a sequence of bit
errors is not detected and corrected, it can cause system errors and reduce closed-loop performance. The
phenomenon has been studied extensively at the component level by semiconductor manufacturers.4,8, 9 In
this context, both analytical models and data are available to provide SEU probability estimates under a
wide variety of circumstances. In contrast, at the system level, the problem has not received much attention.
In Refs. 10, 11, the effect of upsets on system stability was studied for a few fault-tolerant architectures.
However, at present no performance analysis studies are available.
As more commercial aircraft control systems and avionics are implemented using embedded digital hard-
ware, SEU’s have recently come to the attention of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a potential
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safety hazard. In response, a program has been developed with the general goal of quantifying the nature
of the risk and to produce guidelines for the aerospace industry and chip manufacturers. As part of this
program, the authors in cooperation with the NASA Langley Research Center are investigating the effects
of atmospheric neutrons on commercial and experimental flight control hardware in closed-loop with aircraft
simulation software. A set of experiments is underway at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LAN-
SCE) in Los Alamos, New Mexico to provide data. While a variety of different technologies will be tested,























Figure 1. A conceptual closed-loop flight con-
trol system with a recoverable flight control com-
puter.
The error recovery system in this prototype is imple-
mented using dual-lock-step processors together with new
fault tolerant architectures and communication subsys-
tems.12,13 It has most recently been used to study recov-
ery from transient faults introduced by high intensity elec-
tromagnetic radiation.14,15 The error recovery technique
implemented on the RCS is a variation of rollback recov-
ery;16,17 it has the following steps: checkpointing, fault-
tolerant comparison, rollback, and retry. During a check-
point, the state of each microprocessor module is stored.
When an upset is detected, rollback of both microproces-
sor modules to a previous checkpoint takes place, and then
the system is allowed to proceed with normal execution.
But once the execution of the normal control program is
interrupted, the execution of a different control law takes
place, one that has significantly different dynamics and is
on a time scale that can alter the overall closed-loop dy-
namics of the flight control system. These characteristics
of the recoverable system can be modeled as a two-mode
switched system. If there is no upset detected, the system
is operating in its nominal mode. When the controller is
executing a rollback recovery, the system is performing in
its recovery mode. A conceptual diagram of the RCS in a
closed-loop configuration is shown in Fig. 1.
The FAA/NASA research program is centered around the analysis of experimental data collected from
a series of experiments conducted at LANSCE. A conceptual diagram of the testbed is shown in Fig. 2.
A beam of free neutrons is directed through a flux sensor at the device under test, in this case a flight
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 









Figure 2. The testbed for the LANSCE experi-
ments.
control computer. The energy spectrum of the neutron
source is shown in Fig. 3. Its shape is very similar to
that produced by atmospheric neutrons, but the flux is
five to six orders of magnitude higher. The flight con-
trol computer in this setup runs a control program which
processes outputs from a Boeing 737 flight simulation sys-
tem running on a separate host computer. The flight con-
trol computer generates the appropriate control signals
to the aircraft simulation model for maintaining straight
and level flight at a cruising altitude of 34,000 feet. This
interconnection between the flight control computer and
the flight simulation host computer constitutes a closed-
loop feedback control system, which is the unique fea-
ture of these experiments. Under nominal conditions,
i.e., no neutrons, this system regulates the aircraft head-
ing and orientation very well, even under considerable
winds and gusts which can be introduced into the sim-
ulation model. The data acquisition system is maintained on a third computer system. It collects
the flight data from the simulation as well as the measurements from the flux sensor for off-line analy-
sis. Should the aircraft deviate from the nominal flight path at any time, it will be possible to deter-
mine the total radiation dose the flight control computer received up to that instant. When neutrons
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collide with the flight control computer, the specific effects of any disturbance will depend on the par-








































Experimental Neutron Flux at LANSCE
Normalized Atmospheric Neutron Flux (Multiplied by 2.62×105) 
Integrated Neutron Flux Above 1 MeV is 4.18×105 n/cm2/sec 
Figure 3. The neutron energy spectrum at LAN-
SCE in December, 2002.
The main goal of this paper is to model and predict the
output tracking error produced by neutron induced SEU’s.
To this end, a class of stochastic hybrid models is intro-
duced to describe recoverable flight control systems. Both
stochastic finite-state automata (SFSA’s) and finite-state
machines (FSM’s) are used to model the recovery process
of the RCS. In each case, the mean-square stability and
output tracking performance of the hybrid model class are
analyzed. The model is validated in a controlled exper-
iment at NASA’s SAFETI Laboratory, where computer
upsets are injected into the RCS at a specified rate, and
the effects on the output tracking performance of the sim-
ulated aircraft are directly observed and quantified. The
output performance is compared with the theoretical pre-
dictions using the SFSA and FSM models. A separate
publication will address the model’s performance against
the LANSCE data. Since the LANSCE neutron source
is much more intense than normal atmospheric sources,
the final application of these models will be to rescale the
performance predictions made using the LANSCE data to fit aircraft flying in normal operating conditions.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III provide the main theoretical background. Section II
describes the general class of stochastic hybrid models. Section III provides the mathematical tools for
analyzing the stability and output performance of these hybrid models. Sections IV and V employ these tools
to analyze a recoverable flight control system. Specifically, Section IV describes how to model a Boeing 737
system in closed-loop with an RCS. Section V provides the stability and output performance predictions of
the flight control system when subject to SEU’s. Section VI describes the validation of the model using data
obtained from the simulated-neutron environment at NASA Langley. Section VII summarizes the conclusions
and plans for future research.
The mathematical notation used throughout this paper is largely consistent with Ref. 18. Random
variables are denoted in bold italic fonts. The symbol Z+ denotes the set of all non-negative integers. N is
the set of all natural numbers. Rn is the n-dimensional real vector space, and M(Rn) is the normed linear
space of all n × n real matrices. The subset of all symmetric positive semi-definite matrices is M(Rn)+.
H
n
N = {V = (V1, V2, . . . , VN ) : Vi ∈ M(R
n)} will be used to denote the space of all N -tuples of n × n real
matrices. If every Vi of a given V in H
n
N is positive definite or positive semi-definite, this is indicated,
respectively, by V > 0 and V ≥ 0. Hn+N denotes the set {V ∈ H
n
N : V ≥ 0}. Given U, V ∈ H
n
N , the inner
product on HnN is defined by









and ‖V ‖2 = 〈V, V 〉 is the induced norm squared of V . (‖ · ‖ will also be used for representing the standard
norm on Rn.) B (HnN ) is the space of all bounded linear operators on H
n














II. Stochastic Hybrid Models for Recoverable Closed-Loop Systems
A
class of stochastic hybrid models for an aircraft in closed-loop with an RCS is shown in Fig. 4. It
consists of a stochastic hybrid system driven by an SFSA with a Markov input process. Similar to
electromagnetic radiation induced upsets (see Ref. 10), the neutron induced upset process can be modeled
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as a two-state Markov chain. The SFSA models the rollback recovery process. The switched system models
the dynamics of the closed-loop due to the presence of controller recoveries. If the switching process θ(k)
is a Markov chain, then the system’s mean-square stability and output performance can be analyzed using
existing methods (for example, see Refs. 19, 20). However, in most cases, the output process of an SFSA is













Figure 4. The stochastic hybrid model consisting
of a switched system driven by an SFSA.
In the present context, an SFSA is defined as fol-
lows.21,22,23
Definition 1 (SFSA). Let (Ω,F ,Pr) represent the am-
bient probability space. A stochastic finite-state au-
tomaton A is a six-tuple, (ΣI ,ΣS ,ΣO, [0, 1], f, g), where
ΣI = {η1, η2, . . . , ηM} is the set of input symbols; ΣS =
{ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζN} denotes the set of internal states; and
ΣO = {ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξP } is the set of output symbols. Let
ν(k), z(k), and θ(k) denote the input random process,
the state process, and the output process of the automaton, respectively, where k ∈ Z+. f describes the
dynamics of the state transition relation:
f : (ΣS ,ΣI ,ΣS) → [0, 1]
(ζj , ηl, ζi) 7→ Pr
{
z(k + 1) = ζj |
(
ν(k) = ηl,z(k) = ζi
)}
:= [Πηl ]ζiζj ,
which is the ζiζj-th component of the state transition matrix Π
ηl for the input symbol ηl. For fixed i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N} and l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M},
∑N
j=1 [Π
ηl ]ζiζj = 1. The output relation g is described by
g : (ΣO,ΣI ,ΣS) → [0, 1]
(ξt, ηr, ζs) 7→ Pr
{
θ(k) = ξt |
(
ν(k) = ηr,z(k) = ζs
)}
:= [Φηr ]ζsξt ,
where for given s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, 0 ≤
∑P
t=1 [Φ
ηr ]ζsξt ≤ 1.
Definition 2 (FSM). For an SFSA, if both [Πηl ]ζiζj and [Φ
ηr ]ζsξt only assume values 0 or 1 for all ηl, ηr ∈
ΣI , ζi, ζj , ζs ∈ ΣS and ξt ∈ ΣO, then the automaton is called a finite-state machine, and is denoted by the
six-tuple M = (ΣI ,ΣS ,ΣO, {0, 1} , f, g).
Therefore, an FSM is simply a special case of an SFSA. In the current application, it is always assumed
that the output is isomorphic to the state of an SFSA with probability one, that is, P ≡ N and g (ξt, ηr, ζs) =
1{s=t} for all input symbols ηr ∈ ΣI , where 1{s=t} is the Dirac measure. The following theorem describes an
input-output cross chain process generated by an SFSA with a Markov input. The special case for FSM’s
appears in Refs. 24, 25 and the references therein. A similar idea (without proof) also appears in Ref. 26
for random dynamical systems with jumps. A more general Feller-Markov property is proved in Ref. 27 for
continuous-time stochastic systems.
Theorem 1. If the input process ν(k) of an N -state SFSA A is an M -state Markov chain with probability
transition matrix ΠI , which is independent of the initial state of the automaton, z(0), then the Cartesian




, is an MN -state Markov chain
with state transition matrix
ΠI/O = diag (Π
η1 ,Πη2 , . . . ,ΠηM ) · (ΠI ⊗ IN ) . (1)
(Here IN denotes an N × N identity matrix.)
Proof. Only an outline is given here. The complete proof is available in Ref. 28. For any k ∈ Z+, let for exam-
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When k ≥ 2, from the assumptions that ν is Markov and independent of z(0), it follows that































































[ΠI ]ν(k−1)ν(k) . (2)
Applying Lemma 16 in Ref. 28 (with r = 1) gives




















































[ΠI ]ν(k−1)ν(k) . (3)













ν(k − 1), z(k − 1)
)}
,
which implies that the input-state cross process (ν,z) is Markov. From the assumption that the output
process is isomorphic to the state process of the SFSA with probability one, it is immediate that ρ = (ν,θ)
is also Markov with the transition probability
Pr
{(




ν(k − 1) = ηs,θ(k − 1) = ξi
)}
= [ΠI ]ηsηt [Π
ηs ]ξiξj .
The matrix of transition probabilities [ΠI ]ηsηt [Π











[ΠI ]ηM η1 Π






= diag (Πη1 ,Πη2 , . . . ,ΠηM ) · (ΠI ⊗ IN ) ,
which concludes the proof of the theorem.
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III. Stability and Performance Analysis of Stochastic Hybrid Systems
C
onsider the nth-order stochastic hybrid system in Fig. 4 with p output signals given by the state space
model
x(k + 1) =Aθ(k)x(k) + Gθ(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, θ(0) = θ0 (4a)
y(k) =Cθ(k)x(k), (4b)
where θ(k) is a stochastic switching signal produced by the SFSA. Here w(k) is a zero-mean, white noise
process with covariance matrix Im. In general θ(k) is not necessarily Markov, so letting ρ(k) be the Cartesian
product of the input and output processes of the SFSA (see Fig. 5), the analysis can be performed using the
nth-order Markov jump-linear system
x(k + 1) =Ãρ(k)x(k) + G̃ρ(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, ρ(0) = ρ0 (5a)
y(k) =C̃ρ(k)x(k), (5b)
which is equivalent to system (4) in the following sense.
Definition 3 (Model Equivalence). The stochastic hybrid system (4) and the Markov jump-linear system (5)
are said to be model-equivalent if Ãρ(k) := Ã(ν(k),θ(k)) ≡ Aθ(k), G̃ρ(k) := G̃(ν(k),θ(k)) ≡ Gθ(k) and C̃ρ(k) :=
























Figure 5. The equivalent Markov jump-linear model for a
stochastic hybrid system driven by an SFSA.
From the definition, the following result is
immediate.
Lemma 1. When systems (4) and (5) are
model-equivalent, they have the same state
process x(k) and the same output process y(k)
for k ∈ Z+.
This concept is employed in the follow-
ing subsection to perform stability and per-
formance analysis of system (4).
A. Mean-Square Stability of a Stochastic Hybrid System
The stability definition for a stochastic hybrid system used throughout is given below.






→ 0 as k → ∞ for any initial condition x0 with a finite second-order moment and
any initial distributions for ν0 and θ0.
Mean-square stability of the equivalent system (5) can be determined using standard stability results
for Markov jump-linear systems (see Ref. 18). For i = 1, 2, . . . ,M and j = 1, 2, . . . , N , let l = (i −
1)N + j and µl := (ηi, ξj). The symbol set {µl : l = 1, 2, . . . ,MN} labels the elements in ΣI × ΣO. Let
C̄ =
(
C̄µ1 , C̄µ2 , . . . , C̄µMN
)
∈ Hn+MN be an MN -tuple with C̄µl = C̃
T
µl
C̃µl . The linear operators E(·) =
(
Eµ1(·), Eµ2(·), . . . , EµMN (·)
)
∈ B (HnMN ) and L(·) =
(
Lµ1(·),Lµ2(·), . . . ,LµMN (·)
)





















Figure 6. The relationship be-



































(see Fig. 6). From this representation and the results in Ref. 18, the following
stability theorem is evident.
Theorem 2. The following statements regarding system (5) are equivalent:
(a) The Markov jump-linear system is MSS;
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(b) rσ (L) < 1;
(c) rσ (A2) < 1.
From Lemma 1, the following result provides a stability test for the stochastic hybrid system (4).
Lemma 2. A stochastic hybrid system (4) is MSS if and only if the model-equivalent Markov jump-linear
system (5) is MSS.
B. Output Performance of a Stochastic Hybrid Model











: w(k) ≡ 0





: w(k) 6≡ 0,
where J0 is the mean output energy, and Jw is the mean output power. The goal of this section is to produce
explicit analytical expressions for J via a generalization of the observability Gramian described in Refs. 18,29.
This expression for Jw can be shown to be similar to the output’s power semi-norm developed in Ref. 30 for
network controlled systems with data dropouts when both G̃ and C̃ in system (5) are not switched.
Suppose that ρ(k) has a stationary distribution, and ρs is a random variable with this distribution. Then



































The following theorem is a variation of Proposition 8 in Ref. 19.




























Corollary 1. For an MSS Markov jump-linear system (5), where ρ(k) is aperiodic and ergodic, if x0 = 0,







































































which completes the proof.
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This corollary and the following lemma are used to produce the main performance theorem.
Lemma 3. For an MSS Markov jump-linear system (5), given any P = (P1, P2, . . . , PMN ) ∈ H
n
MN :
(a) if w = 0, and for any k ∈ Z+ x0 and ρ(k) are independent, then
E
{







(b) if x0 = 0, and for any k ∈ Z
+ w(k) and ρ(k) are independent, then
E
{













Proof. See Ref. 31.
The main results concerning output performance are given next. Specifically, it is shown that J0 and Jw
can be concisely written in terms of generalized observability Gramians.
Theorem 4. Consider an MSS Markov jump-linear system (5), where ρ(k) is aperiodic and ergodic.






























, and Lk denotes the composition of L k times with
L0(C̄) := C̄.























where Ḡρs := G̃ρsG̃
T
ρs







Proof. See Refs. 31,32.
From Lemma 1, the following result concerning output performance of the stochastic hybrid system (4)
is easily verified.
Lemma 4. The output performance metrics J0 and Jw of the stochastic hybrid system (4) are equivalent to
that of the model-equivalent Markov jump-linear system (5).
The next sections demonstrate how to apply the stability and performance tools developed in this section
to analyze the output tracking performance of an aircraft with a recoverable flight control system.
IV. Modeling an Aircraft System in Closed-Loop with an RCS
I
n this section, models for a Boeing 737 flight control system in closed-loop with an RCS are developed.
These mathematical models are used in the subsequent section to analyze the tracking performance of the
system.
A. System Identification of the Boeing 737 Simulation Model with an RCS
The first step in the model building process was to identify two state space models for a Boeing 737 in level
flight: one for the nominal mode Σn : (An, Gn, Cn) and one for all the recovery modes Σr : (Ari , Gri , Cri),
i = 1, 2, . . . , 6, simply denoted as Σr : (Ar, Gr, Cr). I/O data was collected for identification using the
nonlinear Boeing 737 Simulink model described in Ref. 33. The control characteristics of the RCS are
discussed in Refs. 14,15. The only “inputs” in this case are the noise signals, which are used in the Simulink
code to drive the Dryden wind gust model. The output signal was chosen to be the altitude of the aircraft.
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The function pem from MATLAB’s System Identification Toolbox was used for identifying the models.
Seventeen sets of data containing 2, 000 samples each were used for building the nominal model, and another
35 sets of data were used to verify the model. The identified model for the nominal mode Σn was an eighth-
order system. Since the recovery mode is usually unstable, it was assumed that the system normally operates
in this mode for a short period of time. Therefore, 190 data sets with only 200 samples per set were used
for identification. Another 35 sets were used for verification. The identified model of the recovery mode Σr
was sixth-order.
B. The Switched System
It is only possible to switch between Σn and Σr if their respective state space coordinate systems are the same.
But here not even their dimensions are equivalent. To remedy the situation, Σr was embedded into an eighth-
order system in such a way that the new system, Σ̂r, had the same controllability indices as Σn, specifically,
{3, 3, 2}. Therefore, each system can be transformed to the same Brunovsky form,34 and the switching
{ }, ,n n nA G C n
T
rT
{ }{ }ˆ ˆ, , ,n rA G C C 







{ }ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,n n nA G C
( )ˆ ˆ,r rK L
{ }, ,r r rA G C { }, ,r r rA G C   { }ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,r r rA G C
Figure 7. The Brunovsky canonical form acts as
a “bridge” between the state space models for the
two system modes Σn and Σr.
can be done (formally) by switching between state space
gain matrices, K̂n and K̂r, and input transformation ma-
trices, L̂n and L̂r. Specifically, Fig. 7 shows how the
Brunovsky canonical form acts as a “bridge” between
the controller canonical forms of the two modes. Σn
is transformed into its controller canonical form Σ̂n by











by Tr. Then two stable states are
added to Σ̄r to produce an eighth-order system Σ̂r. Now
Σ̂n and Σ̂r can be transformed to the same Brunovsky









spectively, since A◦ = Ân−ĜnL̂nK̂n = Âr −ĜrL̂rK̂r and
G◦ = ĜnL̂n = ĜrL̂r. The switching between Σ̂n and Σ̂r
can be done using K̂ := K̂n − K̂r, L̂n and L̂r, because
Ân = Âr + G
◦K̂ and Ĝn = ĜrL̂rL̂
−1
n .
C. Rollback Recovery Modeling
The rollback recovery process can be modeled in a variety of ways. The most accurate approach models the
actual freezing of the control signals, the rolling back of the control data, the logic of the recovery process, and
the delay introduced into the feedback loop. Such an approach is described in Refs. 11,35 for the simplified
longitudinal dynamics of the F-16. The complexity of the Boeing 737 nonlinear simulation model in Ref. 33
required that a much simpler approach be taken: only the rollback recovery delay was modeled using either














Figure 8. The FSM used to model
the rollback recovery process of the
RCS.
were six frames in length (1 frame = 0.05 sec) and 20% were five
frames. Any request for a recovery during an active recovery process
was ignored. This information was encoded into an FSM by assum-
ing that all the recovery periods were six frames. For better accuracy,
an SFSA was also designed to match the recovery length probability
distribution. The corresponding FSM M = (ΣI ,ΣS ,ΣO, {0, 1}, f, g)
and SFSA A = (ΣI ,ΣS ,ΣO, [0, 1], f, g) are shown in Figs. 8 and 9,
respectively. The input process to the FSM/SFSA is a homogeneous,
two-state, first-order Markov chain. The probability transition matrix
of the Markov chain is ΠI . The set of states for the Markov chain is
ΣI = {0, 1}, where “0” indicates that no upset was detected and “1” in-
dicates that an upset has been detected. The FSM/SFSA symbol sets
are ΣS = {N,R1, . . . , R6} and ΣO = {n, r1, . . . , r6}. f is defined by
Π0 and Π1, and g is a state-to-output isomorphism. The FSM/SFSA
produces at its output the random signal θ(k), which switches between
the symbols “n” and “ri”, i = 1, 2, . . . , 6 representing the “nominal”
mode and the “recovery” modes, respectively.
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(a) The state transition diagram for in-














(b) The state transition diagram for in-
put symbol “1”, which specifies Π1.
Figure 9. The SFSA used to model the rollback recovery process of the RCS.
V. Tracking Performance Analysis of the Boeing 737 Flight System
S
etting the reference input r(k) ≡ 0, the nominal (unswitched) system compared against the system with
recoveries gives rise to an output tracking error described by the following state space model:
xe(k + 1) = Ae,θ(k) xe(k) + Ge,θ(k)w(k), xe(0) = xe,0, θ(0) = θ0 (8a)




















. x̂(k) and x̂n(k) are the state vectors of the switched and nominal closed-loop systems; w(k)
is a zero-mean white noise process used to generate a wind input; and ye(k) is the closed-loop output tracking
error. The models Σ̂n and Σ̂r described in Subsection IV-B were used to build the 16th-order system (8).





· (ΠI ⊗ I7) .
Setting ΠI =
(
1−[ΠI ]01 [ΠI ]01
1 0
)
, where parameter [ΠI ]01 is the probability of an upset, Fig. 10 shows rσ (A2)




























(a) [ΠI ]01 ∈ [0, 1].




























(b) [ΠI ]01 ∈ [0, 0.002].
Figure 10. rσ (A2) as a function of upset probability for the SFSA stochastic hybrid model and the FSM hybrid
dynamical model.
plotted as a function of [ΠI ]01. The SFSA stochastic hybrid model is MSS when [ΠI ]01 < 0.0016, which is a
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slightly higher stability boundary than that predicted by the FSM hybrid model. When the system is MSS,
the predicted mean output tracking error power, Jw, is shown in Fig. 11 for each model. As it might be
expected, the higher the upset probability, the larger the output tracking error power. In addition, the error
power is unbounded at the stability boundary.

































Prediction from an FSM
Prediction from an SFSA
Experimental Cluster Mean
Figure 11. The SFSA/FSM-predicted mean out-
put tracking error powers as a function of upset
probability and the experimental results for six
specific upset probabilities.
Figure 12. The RCS experimental environment in the
SAFETI Laboratory at NASA Langley.
VI. Model Validation Using the NASA Experimental Data
A
series of experiments was conducted in a simulated neutron environment at the NASA Langley Research
Center’s SAFETI Laboratory. Fig. 12 shows the experimental testbed and the RCS developed by Honey-
well. The RCS flight control system was connected in closed-loop with a Boeing 737 flight simulation system
running on a separate host computer. The input reference signals were set to maintain straight and level
flight at a cruising altitude of 34, 000 feet. A data acquisition system was maintained on a third computer
system. It collected flight data during the simulation. Neutron interactions were simulated by triggering
rollback recoveries according to a pre-determined Markov upset process while the aircraft flew in 1 ft/sec
(light) winds. High wind conditions were not tested since they can excite nonlinear modes in the aircraft
dynamics, which are not modeled in the present jump-linear framework. Data was collected for 60 one-hour
(real time) flights.






































Figure 13. The distribution of ten output tracking
error powers for six specific upset probabilities.
Ten sets of experimental data were collected for each
of the following six upset probabilities [ΠI ]01: 0, 0.0001,
0.0004, 0.0006, 0.0009, and 0.0012. In each case, dif-
ferent sample functions from the corresponding Markov
process ν(k) were used to supply the RCS with a series
of recovery requests for the closed-loop system. The ten
experimental output tracking error powers for each value
of [ΠI ]01 are shown in Fig. 13. Cluster analysis, a tool for
analyzing under sampled data sets, was used to exclude
the outliers for each probability.36 Specifically, as shown
in Fig. 14, hierarchical clustering diagrams were used
based on the Euclidean distances between the measured
output powers. The dashed lines denote experimental
data which was discarded because it was far away from
the main clusters (indicated in solid lines). Here the
one or two highest links were removed if they were ap-
proximately four times higher than the other links. The
average output tracking error powers for the six proba-
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bilities were computed empirically from the experimental output data within the main cluster. The results
are shown in Fig. 11 and compared against the theoretical predictions using both the SFSA and the FSM.
The SFSA prediction is superior, as it is slightly closer to the experimental curve.






















(a) [ΠI ]01 = 0.





















(b) [ΠI ]01 = 0.0001.




















(c) [ΠI ]01 = 0.0004.






















(d) [ΠI ]01 = 0.0006.























(e) [ΠI ]01 = 0.0009.






















(f) [ΠI ]01 = 0.0012.
Figure 14. The cluster analysis diagrams for six specific upset probabilities.
VII. Conclusions
I
n this paper, a class of stochastic hybrid models was introduced for modeling recoverable closed-loop
systems subject to Markovian upset processes. A mean-square stability criteria was developed using a
model-equivalent Markov jump-linear system. Output performance was characterized in terms of a new
generalized observability Gramian. The model was then applied to a Boeing 737 in closed-loop with an
RCS subject to neutron induced SEU’s. Performance predictions were validated using data from a simulated
neutron environment at NASA Langley. In the future, these analysis tools will be used to rescale performance
estimates derived from real (accelerated) neutron tests conducted at Los Alamos. This will allow the FAA
to assess any potential safety hazards due to SEU’s for aircraft flying under normal atmospheric conditions.
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